Queens Identity Theft & Credit Card "Bust Out" Scheme Results in Indictment of Five PC Richards Employees
Only days ago, I published an entry regarding the new Cybercrime and Identity Theft Bureau in the Manhattan District Attorney's Office. Having served as a member of that bureau's predecessor, the Identity Theft Unit, during my seven years as a prosecutor under Robert Morgenthau, I commented on the necessity of such a unit despite my adversarial role as a New York criminal defense attorney. I don't think anyone could argue the significance of this expanded bureau as schemes involving Identity Theft and Computer Crime continue to flourish in New York and beyond.
Although the most recent arrests and allegations stem from the Queens County District Attorney's Office, the purpose of such a unit or bureau has once again been made clear. According to the Queens County District Attorney's Office, twelve individuals, including five employees at PC Richards and Sons, have been arrested and indicted in a fraudulent credit card "bust out" scheme. The 92 count indictment charges Raza Chaudry, Reema Chaudry, Tahir Chaudry, Azadar Chaudry, Zishan Chaudry, Shaheen Akhtar. Hemet Adnand, Mathew Alli, Mohammad Aslam, David Francis, Benzy Jonny and Sheikh "Naveed" Zaheer with crimes including Grand Larceny, Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument, Falsifying Business Records and Offering a False Instrument for Filing. Although they are not charged with the technical crime of Identity Theft, it is alleged that the "bust out" scheme involved stolen social security numbers. According to the Queens District Attorney's Office, a search warrant resulted in the recovery of "Pakistani passports belonging to several of the defendants and bearing multiple names and dates of birth, blank Social Security cards, Canadian and New York driver’s licenses and binders containing in excess of 300 credit cards."
Briefly, a "bust out" scheme involves transactions on a credit car where the credit card is "swiped" and a transaction is completed. The credit card company pays the merchant for the transaction or purchase. There are numerous variations going forward. For example, a "collusive merchant" may be aware that the card swiped is fraudulent. However, the merchant will get paid by the credit card company and claim he sold the items and he should not be at a loss because he did not know the card was fraudulent. Therefore, the merchant keeps the money from the alleged legitimate transaction without selling anything and shares the fee with fake buyer.
Another variation is alleged in this case. It appears that fraudulent checks were used to increase credit lines on credit cards. In an example of this, an individual takes out a credit card in another person's name without their permission, or in some circumstances pays that person to use their information. Sometimes legitimate transactions are made thereby raising the credit of the card over time. At some point a payment is made to the credit card, but with a bad check. Because of relaxed regulations, once the check hits the account and before there is a determination that the check is "good," the credit card company credits the account in the amount of the check. Therefore, there is a window of time before the check bounces that the credit card balance is falsely lowered. During this time, the fraudster can make further purchase. Once the credit card company realizes is, the items are gone. This cycle often continues with fake checks until a credit card with a limit of $5,000 is "busted out" in the amount of $25,000. Often times these schemes are not one or two credit cards, but a network of individuals with dozens or hundreds of credit cards. As a prosecutor in Manhattan, I led a similar investigation with the Secret Service into a particular scheme involving well north of 100 credit cards with "bust out" fraud in the multiple millions.
